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Abstract. Alter (2016) elaborates and defends an ambitious argument advanced by Chalmers (2002) against 
physicalism. As Alter notes, the argument is valid. But I will argue that not all its premises are true. In partic-
ular, it is false that all physical truths are purely structural. In denying this, I focus not on the objects of pure 
physical theory but on the homely, macroscopic objects of our daily lives. 
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Grįžtant prie struktūros ir dinamikos argumento prieš materializmą 
Santrauka. Alteris (2016) papildo ir gina ambicingą Chalmerso (2002) teiginį, nukreiptą prieš fizikalizmą. 
Anot Alterio, šis argumentas yra galiojantis. Bet šiame straipsnyje teigiama, kad ne visos šio argumento prie-
laidos yra teisingos. Norima pabrėžti, kad prielaida, esą visos fizinės tiesos grynai struktūrinės, yra klaidinga. 
Paneigiant šias prielaidas, straipsnyje susitelkiama ne į grynos fizinės teorijos objektus, bet į mūsų kasdienybę 
ženklinančius ir mums artimus, makroskopinius objektus.
Pagrindiniai žodžiai: struktūros ir dinamikos argumentas, fizikalizmas, dualizmas, mintiniai eksperimentai, 
a priori sąlygojimas, aiškinimo plyšys, struktūrinės tiesos
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In his “Consciousness and Its Place in Nature” (2002), Chalmers had sought a unifying 
pattern to the challenges to materialism raised by Mary-the-scientist, the explanatory gap, 
and the conceivability of zombies. 
Briefly, recall what challenges these posed to materialism. First, Mary the scientist 
can’t deduce what she learns about redness, when she first consciously sees it, from what 
she had known about the physical substrate of redness (Jackson 1982). Secondly, consider 
the explanatory gap: even if we could identify a mental state or event with its physical 
correlate, the identification, and ascertaining we are in the requisite physical state, would 
jointly fail to explain why we are also in the corresponding mental state (Levine 1983). 
Thirdly, what the possibility of zombies indicates (if that possibility obtains) is that there 
may be creatures who have the same cognitive functional architecture as we do, yet lack 
consciousness, which would seem to suggest that consciousness cannot be fully charac-
terized in functional terms (Chalmers 1996).
What do these challenges to materialism share? Chalmers writes:
These three sorts of argument are closely related. They all start by establishing an epistemic 
gap between the physical and phenomenal domains. Each denies a certain sort of close epis-
temic relation between the domains: a relation involving what we can know, or conceive, or 
explain. In particular, each of them denies a certain sort of epistemic entailment from physical 
truths P to the phenomenal truths Q: deducibility of Q from P, or explainability of Q in terms 
of P, or conceiving of Q upon reflective conceiving of P. (Chalmers 2002: 250)
Alter’s (2016) paper – “The Structure and Dynamics Argument against Material-
ism” – is a lucid exposition, exploration and defense of this ambitious argument advanced 
by Chalmers against materialism about the mind. For a first pass, Alter formulates the 
argument as follows:
(1)  All physical truths are purely structural.
(2)  From purely structural truths, one can deduce only further purely structural truths.
(3)  Some truths about consciousness are not purely structural.
(4)  Therefore, there are truths about consciousness that cannot be deduced from (i.e., 
are not a priori entailed by) the complete physical truth. (Alter 2016: 795)
In what follows, I will discuss this version of the argument.1 If the argument were to 
succeed, then various challenges (Mary, zombies, the explanatory gap) would all under-
mine materialism for a principled and common reason, viz. (4). However, I will argue 
that, while the argument above is valid, it isn’t sound because premise (1) is false. 
Before evaluating its premises, I start by narrowing down the target of the argument. 
Only type C materialism is a proper target of Alter and Chalmers’ argument. To see this, 
it helps to have Chalmers’ (2002) classification between types A, B, and C of materialism 
in view. Type A materialism (e.g., Churchland 1979, Dennett 1991) is eliminativist about 
1 Various revisions and refinements are called for to improve the argument, which Alter operates. However, 
my critique of this argument remains virtually unchanged revisions added, and so it seems best to keep the simpler 
version of the argument in mind, since this seems closest to Chalmers‘ initial line of thought.
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consciousness, holding that either the scientific project of accounting for consciousness 
is largely completed, or else consciousness is an illusory property. Either way, there is no 
ontic or epistemic gap between consciousness and physical properties. So type A mater-
ialists would deny (3) that “some truths about consciousness are not purely structural,” 
for some suitably physicalist meaning of “structural.” So Alter and Chalmers’s argument 
couldn’t target them without begging the question on (3). 
Consider now type B materialists, who think there is an epistemic gap between con-
sciousness and physical properties, but there is no ontic gap. It is, in Tye’s (1995) view, 
metaphysically necessary that consciousness supervenes on the physical, even if this 
cannot be fully explained in terms of our current conceptual repertoire, and Mary’s case 
or zombies can be imagined. Alter and Chalmers’ argument doesn’t threaten such a view 
because it endorses conclusion (4). It can do so because the existence of an epistemic (as 
opposed to ontic) gap suffices to grant that consciousness truths aren’t deducible from 
physical truths.2 
If only type C materialism can be a proper target of Alter and Chalmers’ argument, 
why is that so? Type C materialists hold that the epistemic gap between phenomenal and 
physical truths is bridgeable by ideal science, though not by current science. As Chalmers 
(2002) describes them, 
Nagel (1974) has suggested that just as the pre-Socratics could not have understood how 
matter could be energy, we cannot understand how consciousness could be physical, but a 
conceptual revolution might allow the relevant understanding. [And] McGinn (1989) has sug-
gested that the problem may be unsolvable by humans due to deep limitations in our cognitive 
abilities, but that it nevertheless has a solution in principle.
Both type C materialism, and Alter and Chalmers, rely on the idea of a completed 
science. This surfaces in the argument in phrases like “the complete physical truth” and 
“all physical truths.” Type C materialists think completed science will vindicate physic-
alism. Its opponents think it will not. This helps with the hard problem of consciousness 
because, the thought goes, the explanatory gap is bridgeable at the end of inquiry, when 
we will have the right concepts to grasp the metaphysical necessity of how consciousness 
relates to physical properties. 
On the construal of the concept of structure advocated by Chalmers (2015), (1) involves 
a partial Ramsey-sentence of a physical theory,3 which functionalizes all terms except for 
mathematical expressions, and perhaps a few fundamental physical magnitudes (e.g., mass 
and spin). Completed physical science, on this view, would include only structural truths 
(per (1)) in the sense that all its truths would boil down to mathematical constructions 
out of these few fundamental magnitudes. But consciousness, the thought goes, cannot 
2 Against type B materialism, Chalmers (2002) and Alter (2016) both gesture towards Chalmers‘ two-dimen-
sional logic. That use requires separate defense, and I find myself broadly sympathetic to an alternative 2D logic, that 
of Davies and Humberstone (1980); Dever’s (2007) comments point in a similar direction. However, I grant Alter 
and Chalmers’ move here for the sake of argument. 
3 Originating in Ramsey (1931).
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be functionalized away in this sense (per (3)). So, as (4) puts it, some truths about con-
sciousness could not be a priori deduced from structural physical truths.
This understanding of Alter and Chalmers’ argument already offers an objection that 
I will develop. In order for the argument to work against type C materialism, it needs to 
apply to ideal completed science at the end of inquiry. Whatever the structural truths of 
completed science may be,4 they must differ from the truths we hold about “the middle-
sized dry goods” of daily life, as Austin called them, such as cherries and bowls.
Take a simple statement like “A bowl of cherries is on the table.” Suppose this is true. 
Cherries and bowls are physical objects; so this is a physical statement. A structural-dy-
namic translation of this statement would have to be made in the language of elementary 
particles, fields, and the like.5 Now ask: Is there a way to translate this statement without 
remainder? I believe not.6 Failing the ability to translate statements like “A bowl of 
cherries in on the table” in the language of fundamental physics (however idealized and 
completed), it follows that (1) is false: not all physical truths are structural.7
There’s nothing obviously structural about cherries or bowls. Absent an adequate 
structural description of the macroscopic physical objects of our day to day life, framing 
the issue of dualism in Alter and Chalmers’ way leads to assimilating important dualisms, 
like that between mind and matter, to spurious dualisms, like that between cherry bowls 
and their microphysical constituents. If the mind-body dualism were no more principled, 
or unbridgeable, than “cherry-bowl dualism” (to use Alter’s apt phrase), then the argument 
(1)-(4) clearly fails to capture why the explanatory gap is troubling, starting from our 
conceptual repertoires and metaphysical leanings to date.
Helpfully, an anonymous reviewer suggested that my take on the argument is mistaken 
since I’m simply begging the question against Alter and Chalmers on (1). This was reveal-
ing, for I intended no such thing. Consider an analogy. Prior to any theoretical endeavors, 
we are all (I hope) tempted to think that our pets, small furry cats and dogs, aren’t robots. 
It is, however, quite possible for a freshman in the grip of Descartes’ views to think that 
such animals are robots. To be sure, although one proposition believed is the negation of 
4 This formalistic view on which completed science is a set of truths closed under logical consequence (or a 
priori entailment) does injustice to what science looks like now. Some mechanistic philosophers (e.g., Craver 2006) 
sees current neuroscientific research as building partial and inaccurate models of discovered mechanisms, with little 
attention to the logical properties of carefully formulated textbook theory. To simply assume problems of current 
science will go away in the ideal future is less than ideal.
5 At the very least, this challenge should bring out how radical (1) is. Ontic structural realists (cf. Zahar 2004) 
will characterize laws of motion and the like as structural. But they shy away from claiming that all physical truths 
are structural. Ontic structural realism is silent about bowls of cherries, it only speaks of mass, spin, and the like.
6 Stories could be told about such possible translations. Choose a geometry; then identify volumes in that space, 
and assign them various attributes (mass, color, etc.). One may insist this may be done, with tedious (and, in prin-
ciple, infinite) specification of detail. However, once one grants that details to be specified are infinite, it is clear that 
the task cannot be completed by mortals like us. 
7 One might try to save (1) by saying that “bowl of cherries” is a predicate which applies to a certain distribu-
tion of elementary particles. Perhaps no property is expressed by this predicate. Or perhaps it is a universal, hence 
an abstract object, hence not a worry for physicalists. Either option implies an unpalatable eliminativism about the 
objects of common sense (bowls, cherries, tables, etc.) which the philosopher might debate, but the layperson will 
discard without a blink. Either option would fail to address the historically genuine problem of dualism, which does 
have a grip over us.
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the other, there is a significant burden of proof that Descartes’ follower must meet, which 
the advocate of ordinary thought need not. To rebut the everyman by telling them they 
are simply begging the question against the Cartesian is to make much of dialectic, and 
little of sound thought. That, I believe, applies here as well. 
I argued that premise (1) in the structure and dynamics argument against materialism 
is false. That doesn’t imply materialism is true. One may still be persuaded by individual 
thought-experiments against materialism, and their attendant arguments: Mary the scientist, 
possible zombies, or the explanatory gap for consciousness. The fact that different thinkers 
find themselves moved by some – and only some – of these arguments should have warned 
us against the chances of unifying these anti-materialistic challenges into a master-argument. 
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